

## NSC BRIEFING

17 June 1954

## KOREAN ORDER OF BATTLE

## I. Chinese Communist Ground Forces: (Armies--Unit Strength - 43,441)

## II. North Korean Ground Forces: (Corps--Unit Strength)

- 28,892)

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III. ROK Ground Forces: (Divisions--Unit Strength - 14,000)

A. On Front -- (1) At Cease-Fire - 10  
(2) At Present - 13

B. In Korea -- (1) At Cease-Fire - 15  
(2) At Present - 20

C. Present Total -- ~~638,000~~ (men)

D. ROK replaced UN units in less critical areas as trained. ROK 21st put in critical Chorwon area on 4 June.

IV. US Ground Forces: (Divisions--Unit Strength - 18,000)

A. On Front -- (1) At Cease-Fire - 6  
(2) At Present - 3

B. In Korea -- (1) At Cease-Fire - 8  
(2) At Present - 6

C. Present Total -- 235,500 (men)

D. Commonwealth Division, Turk Brigade and seven miscellaneous UN battalions (total 33,500) are in addition to above.

V. Air Strength

A. North Korea -- 170 MIG-15's, 100 piston fighters and ground attack, 30 TU-2 piston bombers, 40 IL-28 jet bombers.

B. Communist (Manchuria) -- 300 Chinese and 250 Soviet MIG-15's, 130 Chinese IL-28's plus some or all North Korean bombers.

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- C. South Korea -- 80 F-51 piston fighters.
- D. All North Korean aircraft except bombers moved into Korea just prior to or after armistice. Chinese air strength Manchuria decreased 100-125 MIG's since armistice. Soviets deactivated 4 fighter regiments since armistice. North Korean air strength about same.

#### VI. North Korean vs South Korean capabilities.

- A. Approximately equal in ground combat strength.
- B. North greatly superior in air strength.
- C. South deficient in antiaircraft artillery.
- D. North possesses higher total most major fire support weapons.
- E. Both dependent on outside logistical aid.
- F. North air superiority and availability logistical support probably decisive.

#### VII. General

- A. Although current disposition and attitude of enemy forces in Korea are defensive, Communist forces retain the capability to attack with little warning. They could not, because of Chinese withdrawals, sustain a major offensive without reinforcements from Manchuria.

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B. Chinese have withdrawn eight of the nineteen armies in Korea just prior to the armistice. Chinese strength in Korea has been reduced from a wartime peak of 872,000 to 660,000. There are indications that relief of the 16th Chinese Army may be imminent, which would make the North Korean and South Korean forces occupy the same frontline area.

C. Expansion and activation of ground units has increased North Korean strength from 282,000, at the time of the armistice to a present 356,000. Major components of the North Korean army include: 19 infantry divisions, 7 infantry brigades, 7 armored regiments, 12 AAA regiments and 4 AAA battalions.

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E. There are reports of integration of Chinese into Korean units on a small scale. No confirmation that a large-scale integration plan to augment Korean forces is under way.

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
## VIII. Naval Forces

- A. The North Korean navy is equipped with small patrol and mine craft, but has no major combat vessels.
- B. The South Korean navy is equipped with 24 patrol, 11 amphibious and nine auxilliary vessels. *Marine Corps is composed of one combat brigade of two regiments.*

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